A Stackelberg game bidding model for a combined heat and power virtual power plant considering carbon emission flow

Résumé

By aggregating distributed energy resources efficiently and flexibly, a virtual power plant (VPP) is capable of altering the traditional pattern of local consumption. However, existing bidding models and scheduling strategies have notable deficiencies in addressing multi-agent conflicts of interest and the 
allocation of carbon emission responsibilities. To overcome the aforementioned drawbacks, a bidding model for a combined heat and power virtual power plant (CHP-VPP) is developed in the present study. Based on the overall transaction information and energy flow direction, the competitive relationship between the 
operator and the consumer aggregator are clarified. To trace the carbon footprint in the power delivery network, a carbon‑emission flow model is additionally adopted, which enables the equitable allocation of emission duties from the internal production plants to the demand side. In this model, the operator acts as 
the game leader in formulating pricing strategies, while the consumer aggregator, as the follower, responds to the price signals with the objective of maximizing its own revenue, forming a Stackelberg game framework. In addition, the emission‑related cost is included in the objective function of the sub‑level aggregator. 
A mechanism offering incentives for carbon abatement is also proposed to motivate the on‑site generators and consumers to act jointly within a game‑theoretic framework, which can fully unlock the demand‑side's carbon‑cutting capability. Case study results demonstrate that the proposed model can effectively reduce 
carbon emissions while improving system economic performance, ultimately 
achieving coordinated low-carbon operation on both the supply and demand 
sides.